case breakdown

Thousands of Leaked Cloud Keys Still Work... The AWS Access Key Problem

Thousands of AWS access keys found in public sources still opened the cloud accounts behind them. Removing a leaked key from view does not make the key stop working.

Incident overview

Truffle Security reported finding 64,024 unique AWS access keys across public code, container images, and datasets. Independent reporting on the research says 10,616 complete key pairs could be rechecked, and about 88 percent of that sample still authenticated.

Why it works

A working system makes change feel risky while the danger from an exposed credential can remain invisible. Status quo bias helps explain why leaving a functioning key alone may feel safer than replacing it, even after the key has become public.

Protective actions

  1. Treat a public password, access key, token, or other secret as copied.
  2. Do not stop after removing the secret from the page or file where it was exposed.
  3. Disable the exposed credential, create a replacement, update the systems that use it, and then delete the old credential when it is no longer needed.
  4. Review logs and connected resources for signs that the exposed credential was used.
  5. Prefer temporary credentials and roles when possible so long-lived access keys are not left active indefinitely.

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A public key can keep opening a private door

An AWS access key is a pair of credentials that software can use to make requests to Amazon Web Services. What the key can reach depends on the permissions attached to it. A narrowly scoped key may reach one small part of a cloud environment. A highly privileged key may reach much more.

Truffle Security reported finding 64,024 unique AWS access keys in public code, container images, and datasets. Independent reporting on the research says the team had complete credentials for 10,616 of those keys and rechecked them. About 88 percent still authenticated.

That percentage applies to this particular sample. It does not mean 88 percent of every exposed AWS key is still active.

The access behind some keys was especially powerful. The rechecked sample included 526 root keys and 242 IAM users with AdministratorAccess. A root key belongs to the AWS account’s root user. AdministratorAccess is an AWS-managed policy that can provide broad control over an account.

The research shows that thousands of credentials discovered in public still opened the cloud environments behind them. It does not prove that every key was used by an attacker.

Removing the post does not cancel the badge

Imagine an employee loses a master access badge. A stranger copies it and posts the working copy online.

The company gets the post removed, but nobody deactivates the badge. The public post is gone. Every copy that was already saved can still open the door.

That is the difference between removing an exposed secret from view and replacing the secret itself. Deleting the file or cleaning the current version of a repository does not force saved copies to disappear. The old credential must stop working.

The psychology: status quo bias

Status quo bias is the tendency to prefer leaving an existing choice in place. The current option can feel safer or easier simply because it is already working.

In a series of decision problems published in 1988, William Samuelson and Richard Zeckhauser gave participants the same available options but changed which option was presented as the current choice. People were more likely to select an option when it was framed as the status quo. The preference also grew stronger in several scenarios as the number of alternatives increased.

Those experiments did not involve cybersecurity or AWS. Rotating a real credential can also require legitimate technical work. Applications may need to be updated, dependencies checked, and teams coordinated.

The useful parallel is narrower. When a system is still functioning, replacing its credentials can feel like the risky action. The exposed key keeps working, the danger is mostly invisible, and “we will change it later” begins to feel safer than touching a live system.

Fact, interpretation, and uncertainty

The key counts, reauthentication result, permission findings, rotation rate, and key-age measurements come from Truffle Security’s research and independent reporting on it.

The status quo bias connection is Connor’s cyberpsychology interpretation. It does not establish why any particular key owner left a credential active. Technical dependencies, ownership gaps, incomplete inventories, and other operational factors may also affect credential rotation.

The public research demonstrates continuing access. It does not establish that every exposed key was abused or that every key had the same level of access.

Change the lock, not just the listing

If a password, access key, token, or another secret becomes public, treat it as copied.

Remove the public exposure, but do not stop there. Disable the old credential, create a replacement, update the systems that need it, and delete the old key when it is no longer required. Review relevant logs and resources for unexpected activity.

AWS also recommends replacing long-lived access keys with temporary credentials and roles when possible. That reduces the number of permanent digital keys that can be forgotten.

If strangers found a key to your house, you would change the locks. Replacing an exposed access key is basic security.

Full spoken transcript

Thousands of leaked AWS access keys are still working. An AWS access key is basically a username and password software uses to access an Amazon cloud account. You can think of it like a digital employee badge. And to be clear, these leaked keys don't access the Amazon account you use to shop from. They're only for Amazon Web Services. And depending on their permissions, the access these keys provide can range from viewing private information all the way up to making major changes to an organization's cloud environment.

Of the more than 10,000 complete key pairs that were rechecked, about 88 percent still authenticated. That 88 percent does only apply to this sample. It doesn't mean that 88 percent of every exposed AWS key ever still works. But the access these keys provided was still pretty significant. Researchers found 526 root keys and another 242 with full administrator access.

That means that hundreds of these keys weren't to a small storage closet. They probably unlocked the entire building. You can think of it like a company employee losing their master access badge. Some random stranger finds it, they copy it, and they post a working version of it online. The company finds the post and they have it removed, but they never actually deactivate the badge. Removing the post doesn't magically fix the situation, and it doesn't make all the existing copies just disappear. Anyone who already saved it can still use it.

It might seem obvious, but you do need to cancel the old badge and create a new one. And the burden of cancelling these keys falls on the customer who owns them, not on AWS. This situation won't resolve itself.

And that's the important part of the story. In the subset where researchers could check whether a new key had been created, only about 14 percent had done so. The average key was five years old and the oldest one was over 17 years old. That means the oldest key had been active since before Instagram existed, and it was publicly available.

Now, to be clear, this research doesn't prove that every one of these keys was abused. It just shows that thousands of keys that are found out in the public still unlock the door that they go to. And this failure to do routine cleanup after your keys are exposed can x really well to status quo bias.

Status quo bias is our tendency to leave things the same because changing feels more uncertain or disruptive. If rotating your credentials or your keys might break something or slow down business, we don't want to do it. Sometimes leaving things alone feels easier. The application is still working, and the danger is mostly invisible. Change is hard and it requires effort. And if it ain't broke, don't fix it, right? So we'll change it later, starts to feel like the safer choice. Even when your keys and your credentials are already public.

In 1988, researchers gave people several different decision problems. All the participants received the same choices. But researchers changed which options were described as the person's existing or current choice. And across each scenario, people were more likely to select an option when it was framed as the status quo or the choice they were told they already made. Even if they hadn't. And the more options they had to consider, the safer they felt with that original choice and the stronger their preference for it became.

Now, choosing between hypothetical options isn't exactly the same as rotating keys and credentials when needed. This can involve legitimate technical work. But the useful parallel here is that if a system is functioning, it can make an exposed key feel safer than it actually is, if it means not changing anything. The fact that nothing has gone wrong yet can easily become the reason that nobody does anything.

So the practical takeaway here is simple. If a password, an access key, or another secret becomes public. Treat it as if someone has already made a copy of it. Don't just remove it from a public page. Disable it and replace it entirely.

If you found out random people had found a key to your house, you'd probably change your locks. Replacing an access key is basic security.

So as always, stay mindful stay resilient. If you lose your key, make sure you replace it and change your locks and follow for more cyberpsychology breakdowns.

Script or transcript notes

The full spoken transcript below is preserved verbatim. The written analysis uses the reported median key age rather than the recording’s word ‘average’ and does not reproduce the recording’s incomplete phrase ‘can x really well.’

Sources

  1. Introducing TruffleHog AWS Analyze: Know What a Leaked AWS Key Can Reach (opens in a new tab)

    Truffle Security · August 20, 2026

    Supports: Primary company report for the public-source research, active-key rate, five-year median age, rotation finding, permission context, and stated limitations on which keys could be examined closely.

  2. Researchers warn thousands of active AWS access keys are publicly exposed (opens in a new tab)

    IT Pro · August 24, 2026

    Supports: Independent reporting for the 64,024 unique keys, 10,616 complete key pairs, 88 percent reauthentication result, 526 root keys, and 242 IAM users with AdministratorAccess.

  3. Status Quo Bias in Decision Making (opens in a new tab)

    Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · March 1, 1988

    Supports: Primary psychology paper for the finding that people were more likely to choose an option when it was framed as the existing choice. The study did not involve cloud credentials or cybersecurity operations.

  4. How an IAM administrator can manage IAM user access keys (opens in a new tab)

    Amazon Web Services

    Supports: Official AWS instructions for creating, deactivating, and deleting IAM access keys.

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